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INTRODUCTION
This chaptcrwill assess the relationship between the perceived quality of
cash management services as measured in the GlobalCash-Europe96
study and the duration of bank relationships. In addition to the responses
received from Norwegian companies to the GlobalCash-Europe96
study, a panel data set was used containing annual information on the
bank connections for virtually all Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)-listed
companies for the period 1979 to 1994.
The results from GIobalCash-Europe96 seem to indicate that the
quality of cash management services for two of Norway's largest banks is
higher than other commercial or savings banks in Norway.' Correspond-
ingly, the duration of a bank relationship between these two banks and
OSE-listed companies tends to be significantly longer than the average
bank in this study. This finding holds even while controlling for compa-
ny-specific characteristics, such as the number of maintained simultane-
ous bank relationships, equity ownership concentration, size, growth
potential and leverage.
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Hence the perceived quality of cash management services is poten-
tially positively related to the length of a company-bank relationship,
although causation is not necessarily unidirectional. Banks offering high
quality services may be able to retain companies longer, as the com-
pany's incentives to switch banks are lowered, ceteris paribus. Altern-
atively, longer relationships may result in a higher quality of services, as
the bank learns and fine tunes its services, whilst companies may be bet-
ter able to exploit the services offered.
When estimating the duration of a company-bank relationship, it is
recognised that consistent estimation of the duration and likelihood of
switching requires an estimator that is robust to the censored sampling
distribution. Non- and fully-parametric estimators of hazard Junctions
have been utilised which describe the likelihood of ending a given bank
relationship, conditional on the length of the existing relationship. Also
analysed is the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about the under
lying distribution of durations.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows:
• an overview of relevant survey results provided by GlobalCash
Europe96
• data on Norwegian bank relationships
• conclusions
CASH MANAGEMENT IN NORWAY
The GlobalCash-Europe96 study was co-ordinated in Norway by the
Norwegian School of Management. Identified cash managers and treas-
urers in the 216 largest Norwegian companies (by sales) and non-
banking financial institutions (by assets) received a personal letter and
12-page questionnaire in Norwegian. Each addressee was telephoned
twice over a two to three week period to encourage completion of
the questionnaire. Eventually, 41 responses were received (22 in
EuroCash94) to yield a response rate of 19 per cent.
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Representing nearly 40 per cent of total commercial and savings bank
assets in Norway, two of Norway's leading banks dominate the Norwe-
gian banking market. This was confirmed in the GlobalCash-Europe96
study. More than 70 per cent of cash managers used one of these banks
for cash management services in 1996 (up from 65 percent in 1994), with
85 per cent listing either bank as their 'first bank' (see Table 12.1).
Table 12.1 Use of Norwegian banks for cash management services in 19%























Source: GlobalCash-Europe96, Question 23. The table reports answers givei
by cash managers in 41 (22) different Norwegian companies to the questioi
'Which banks do you use in your home country for cash management services?'
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About 20 per cent of companies use other commercial banks, while
less than 10 percent of companies reported using a savings bank.
Further, according to GlobalCash-Europe96, the.main criteria for











Level of commitment to your business
Domestic branch network
Reputation for cash management
Bank ratings










Source: GlobaICash-Europe96, Question 23. The table reports answers given
by cash managers in 41 (22) different Norwegian companies to the question
'From the following list, please rank the top 5 criteria that you use in allocating
business between your existing banks.' The mean rank is calculated with 'Most
important' scoring 1, 2
n
d 'Most important' scoring 2, etc., and Not Mentioned
scoring 9.
Other criteria which were mentioned on the survey could easily be in-
cluded in one of these three categories: to compensate for other services is
a price consideration; technology and domestic branch network are import-
ant elements of quality; and the level of commitment to your business, the
reputation for cash management, and the bank ratings have effects upon
the value of the relationship.
In general, two of Norway's leading banks are perceived to be the 'best
bank for cash management services' in 1996 (see Table 12.3) with 28
mentions as the best bank and 26 as the second best. Other commercial
banks or savings banks are far behind both in terms of best and second
best mentions and in the comprehensive scoring, independent of the
weighting scheme used to calculate this score. The question that naturally
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arises is whether this difference in perception between banks corres-
ponds to differences in pricing, relationship or quality.




































Source: GlobalCash-Europe96, Questions 26 and 28. The table reports
answers given by cash managers in 41 (22) different Norwegian companies to
the question 'Which banks do you think are best at providing cash management
services? (you may not be using these banks).' The weighted score is the sum of
best scoring 4 (2), second best scoring 3 (1), third best scoring 3, and fourth best
scoring 1, averaged over the number of banks in the set. The results for 1994 are
listed in paretheses.
The GlobalCash-Europe96 study provides some evidence with respect
to the differences in pricing. Question 27 in the survey probes by asking
'Why do you think that the banks you have named are the best?' A list of
12 criteria includes pricing and, on this basis, 22 respondents chose
either of two of Norway's leading banks as the best or second best bank.
The conditional nature of the question unfortunately leaves only a single
observation for a savings bank and no observations for other commercial
banks.
The GlobalCash-Europe96 study also investigates in more detail the
difference in quality of the cash management services experienced by the
respondents. The detailed results reported in GlobalCash-Europe96 -
Statistical Report for Norway are summarised in Tables 12.4 and 12.S,
using a scoring scheme described in detail below the tables. Cash managers
using the top two banks seem equally pleased with the quality of their
delivered cash management services. Savings bank customers seem less
satisfied. They appear to be concerned especially about the quality of
international EFTs, pooling and the netting services provided by savings
banks.
The third criterion, which is most frequently used by companies in allo-
cating business across banks, is the ongoing relationship. Unfortunately
the GlobalCash-Europe96 study had no questions analysing this aspect
of cash management. To shed some light on the possible relationshipTable 12.4 Experienced quality of cash management services in 1996
Lead bank
Balance Domestic Inter- Pooling Netting Total
reporting EFT national
EFT
Top two com- 51 56 46 56 59 54
mercial banks
Other commer- 8 63 25 100 0 39
cial banks
Savings banks 50 67 0 0 0 23
Second bank
Balance Domestic Inter- Pooling Netting Total
reporting EFT national
EFT
44 38 22 63 50 43
28 50 25 -99 100 21
25 0 -25 -50 -25 -15
Source: GlobalCash-Europe96, Question 24 and authors' own calculations. The table reports answers given by cash managers in 41
different Norwegian companies to the question 'How do you rate the banks which you use in your home country for their cash man-
agement services?' Possible answers were: Excellent, Good, Average, Poor and Very Poor. Calculation: for each bank the proportion
of companies answering 'Excellent' scores 100, 'Good' scores 50, 'Poor' scores-50 and 'Very Poor' scores-100. The obtained score is
then averaged over the number of banks in the set. The total score is the average score for the different services received.
Table 12.5 Experienced quality of cash management services in 1994
Lead bank Second bank
Balance Domestic Inter- Pooling Total Balance Domestic Inter- Pooling Total
reporting EFT national reporting EFT national
Toptwo 51 68 67
commercial
banks
Other commercial 33 50 50
banks
Savings banks NA NA NA
67 63 38 50 84 63 59
NA 44 NA NA 50 NA 21
NA NA 0 NA NA NA 0
NA = not applicable. Source: EuroCash94 and authors' own calculations. The table reports answers given by cash managers in 22 different Norwegian
companies to the question 'How do you rate the banks which you use in your home country for their cash management services?' The
possible answers and scores are as shown in the table.230 Quality and Duration of Bank Relationship
between perceived quality of cash management services and the dura-
tion of the bank-company relationship, an analysis was conducted of a
panel data set containing annual information on the bank connections
for virtually all OSE-listed companies for the 16-year period 1979-94.
BANK RELATIONSHIPS IN NORWAY
Introduction
A distinguishing feature of a bank may be its ability to reduce costly in-
formation asymmetries between those seeking financing and those will-
ing to contribute capital. For instance, a bank may efficiently screen and
monitor a company, reducing the need for other contracting parties to
duplicate the effort. A bank can also help to reduce the likelihood that a
company will choose poor projects by threatening not to renew future
debt contracts. Thus a company that establishes a relationship with a
bank can reduce the uncertainty about future investment projects and
obtain debt financing that would otherwise be unavailable or prohibi-
tively expensive.
It is through the progression of a relationship that a bank learns more
about a company's ability to meet future obligations, both through its
payment history and through other ancillary services offered by the bank
(e.g., deposit, clearing and payment services, lines of credit, etc.).
Because of its ability to observe a stream of proprietary information, the
bank may have the potential to 'informationally capture' customers who
may find it difficult to obtain financing elsewhere.
Ongena and Smith (1997) explore the dependency between the length
of a bank relationship and the decision to terminate the relationship and
find no strong link between the two; in other words, companies with long
relationships are as likely to leave their banks as companies with short re-
lationships. Ongena and Smith (1997) do find that the decision to termin-
ate a bank relationship is influenced by factors other than the duration of
the relationship. For example, companies which maintain a relationship
with more than one bank at a time are more likely to end a given
relationship. Moreover, the likelihood of leaving a bank decreases with
the company's adjusted market value of equity (a measure of company
size) and increases with the company's growth potential (as proxied by
the ratio of market-to-book value of the company) and leverage.
The perceived quality of the banking services a company receives is
also a natural candidate for influencing the likelihood that a company
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will terminate a given relationship (in turn influencing the duration). For
instance, longer relationships may result in higher quality of services.
Alternatively, the bank can learn and fine tune its services, while compa-
nies may be better able to exploit the services offered.
Bank Relationship Data
Data was obtained on bank relationships of OSE-listed companies for
the years 1979 to 1994 from Kierulfs Handbook, an annual handbook
published by Oslo B0rs Informasjon AS, a data-publishing subsidiary of
the OSE.
4 The handbook contains financial and accounting information
on all listed companies, as well as other company-specific information.
In particular, as part of the listing requirements, each company must
report on an annual basis its primary bank connections (up to a max-
imum of four banks).
The duration of a relationship is defined to be the number of years a
company is observed maintaining a bank connection. In a given year, the
sample chosen covers roughly 100 OSE companies, representing 97 per
cent of the population of exchange-listed companies.
A sample observation is defined as one company-bank relationship.
The number of company-bank observations equals the total number of
companies in the sample multiplied by the number of bank relationships
maintained by each company over the sample period. The final data set
contained 263 company bank relationships. Table 12.6 gives some insight
into the concentration of the relationships within the banking industry in
Norway by listing the number of relationships by bank.
s Despite the
relatively large number of banks represented in the sample, the rela-
tionships are concentrated. Approximately 75 per cent of the companies
maintain a relationship with at least one of Norway's two leading
banks.
Survivor Functions
Let T represent the duration of a relationship (he., the amount of time
that passes before a relationship ends). A simple probabilistic way to
describe the length of a relationship is through a survivor function,
S(t) =Pr(T=t), which yields the probability that the relationship Tlasts at
least to time t(the survivor function equals one minus the cumulative
distribution function of T).
It is possible to examine separately the likelihood of ending a banking
relationship, conditional on the duration of the relationship

































cohort comparisons of the estimated survivor functions for different cat-
egories can be plotted: that is, the survivor function of relationships of
companies banking with bank X can be plotted against relationships of
companies not banking with bank X. This process can be repeated for
each individual bank or group of banks (e.g., commercial banks or sav-
ings banks). When plotted,
8 it becomes apparent that two of Norway's
largest banks are likely to have relationships that last significantly longer
than relationships with other commercial or savings banks. This means
that the likelihood of a relationship with either of these two banks lasting
beyond 10 years is roughly 90 per cent. On the other hand, the likelihood
of a relationship with other commercial banks lasting this long is estimat-
ed to be only 30 per cent.
CONCLUSIONS
There is an interesting correspondence between the results from
GlobalCash-Europe96 with respect to quality ratings of cash manage-
ment services by the four main Norwegian banks and the duration of
bank relationships between OSE-listed companies and their banks. The
results from GlobalCash-Europe96 seem to indicate that the quality of
cash management services at two of the largest Norwegian banks is
higher than the quality at other commercial banks or savings banks.
Simultaneously, the estimated duration of bank relationships between
the two of the largest Norwegian banks and OSE-listed companies tends
to be much longer than other commercial banks and savings banks. This
is even the case when controlling for company characteristics like the
number of bank relationships, ownership concentration, size, Tobin's Q,
and debt structure.
There are a number of weaknesses in this study. Since it is not possible
to observe information specific to the contract between each company
and its bank, it can only be guessed how important cash management
services are in the complete spectrum of a banking relationship. The
results are 'suggestive': that is, it is conceivable that other bank activities
weigh more heavily in the decision by a company to continue or dis-
continue a relationship. This points to a second shortcoming of this work,
namely the inability to observe the reason for the termination of a com-
pany-bank relationship. In this work, the implicit assumption is that any
termination is initiated by the company. It is also possible that the bank
terminates the relationship.234 Quality and Duration of Bank Relationship
Drawing a parallel between the perceived quality of cash management
services and the duration of banking relationships implicitly assumes
pricing of these services to be more or less equal across banks. Although
this assumption is more than likely too stringent, given the multidimen-
sional and multiperiod character of the banking product, coupled with
the desire to keep customer information proprietary, there is a lack of
reliable data on the pricing of bank services, and of cash management in
particular. Future GlobalCash studies should include more questions
probing for price and pricing-based decisions. In addition it could be
useful to ask cash manager respondents to report the duration of current
cash management relationships (as far as the organisation's memory
stretches), and the importance of cash management services in the entire
banking relationship. This would allow for further fruitful research on
the duration of bank-company relationships and the impact of these
relationships upon companies' decisions related to the nature of future
business.
APPENDIX: ESTIMATOR FOR THE SURVIVOR FUNCTION
Let h-( be the number of bank relationships with observed duration / and max-
imum duration/, where i,; e [0, K], corresponds to the maximum fixed cut-off (15
years in our data set) and i <;'. An observed duration of zero (i = 0) indicates that
a firm listed a bank in one year, while both / and; are recorded as zero when a firm
is listed for only one year. When /' =;', the spell is right censored; one cannot dis-
tinguish whether the spell ended that year or continued in the unobserved future
hu is the number of censored spells).
Define ht = £ yL0 hv and nk to be the number spells that have neither been com- pleted nor censored as of length k, nk = Z^t'V
 A natural, non-parametric es-
timator for \(k), the likelihood that a firm switches banks in the fcth year given
that the relationship has lasted k years, is
*<*)-£• nk (A.1)
which is the number of switches in year k divided by the number of relationships
that have survived to length k. Note that the estimator X(fc) is robust to right cen-
soring since the denominator in (A.I) normalists the number of switches at
length k by the number of uncensored spells existing at time k.
We define the estimator of the survivor function to be
(A.2)
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which is the Kaplan-Meier (1958) or 'product-limit' estimator for the survivor
function. The approximate variance of the survivor estimates is:
(A.3)
Notes
"The authors have benefited from the research assistance of Didrik von
Haffenbradl and Therese J0rgensen. The research was supported by the Fund
for the Advancement of Bank Education and the Research Programme in
Competitive Enterprises at the Norwegian School of Management.
1 It is possible with GlobalCash-Europe96 to identify the perceived per-
formance of over 250 banks throughout Europe. In order to secure future
co-operation with banks, this information is available only to those organ-
isations that fund the GlobalCash studies. In all other publications, the
identity of individual banks must be disguised.
Much of the motivation for the analysis of bank relationships can be found
in Ongena and Smith (1997).
See GlobalCash-Europe96 statistical report for Norway for more details.
For more details, see Ongena and Smith (1997).
Actual bank names could be revealed but, to maintain consistency with the
principles of GlobalCash-Europe96, bank names are not revealed.
The table reports the number of relationships between OSE-listed com-
panies and banks.
An estimator for the survivor function, robust to right censoring, is intro-
duced in the Appendix.
Actual plots, statistical definitions and models can be further explored in
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